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I.

NATURE OF THE CASE

In this case, Prepaid Dental Services, Inc., Appellant
herein, petitioned the court below for a Declaratory Judgment
declaring that the Findings and Order of Roger

c.

Day,

Commissioner of Insurance of the State of Utah, herein
Respondent, were inconsistent with the definition of "Insurance" as set forth in Section 31-1-7 of the Utah Code Annotated
(1953) and the definition of a "Health Maintenance Organization" within the provisions of Title 21, Chapter 42, Utah
Code Ann.

(1953).

II.

DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN LOWER COURT

The court below issued a Memorandum Opinion which sustained the Findings and Order of the Insurance Department
and dismissed Appellant's
III.

Pet~tion.

NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Respondent seeks an affirmation of the decision of the
lower court which sustained the Findings and Order of the
Insurance Commissioner.
IV.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Appellant and Respondent stipulated to the facts in this
case, and the Appellant has set forth in his Statement of
Facts the verbatim wording of the stipulation, with which
Respondent, of course, agrees.

Appellant additionally

stated that the trial court took no "additional evidence."
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-2The trial court did, in fact, admit a certified copy

of

the Appellant's Articles of Incorporation showing that it
was a "for profit" corporation (R. 248, ·Exp. lP).
is no dispute on this point.

There

Respondent otherwise agrees

with the concluding paragraphs of Appellant's Statement of
Facts which are not quoted from the stipulation.
The trial court, in its Memorandum Opinion summarized
briefly and clearly the undisputed fact situation.
·"The Plaintiff requires the dentists to render
" .•. services described in Exhibit 'A' attached hereto
and incorporated herein by reference, at no·charge
to such Participant or Employer Group other than the
monthly charge then in effect •.. " (Ex. A par.
Eighth). Furthermore, the dentists ihall provide
a "performance bond" such that if the dentist ... "fails
to perform the required services for any reason, the
bonding company will pay such other licensed dentist
as may be designated by the Participant to perform
the services ... "
(Ex. A par. Twelfth). The
substance of the transaction therefore calls for·the
employer to pay to the Plaintiff a monthly charge
for each participant and in exchange for this the
Plaintiff agrees to use its "best efforts" to obtain
lidensed dentists to render professional services as
scheduled. On the other half of the transaction,
the Plaintiff enters into a contract with dentists
who agree to perform the scheduled service.s for an
agreed monthly sum and to furnish a performance bond
to guarantee the participant that if the dentist fails
to " •.. perform the required services for any reason ... "
the bonding company will pay such other licensed
dentists to perform the services as the Participant
may designate."
(R. 251)
V.
A.

ARGUMENT

THE PLAN PROPOSED IS INSURANCE.
The trial court, in its Memorandum Opinion, stated the

issues in this case in clear terms:
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-3"The question before this court is whether or not the
program outlined in the Stipulated Statement of Facts
constitutes "insurance" and if it does, then does it
qualify under the "Health Maintenance Organization
Act."
(31-42-1, et seq.)
The basic question is whether or not this program
constitutes "insurance." The Defendant contends that
when you look at the total program it constitutes a
contract whereby " ... one undertakes to ... allow a ...
benefit upon determinable risk contingencies."
(31-1-7)
Plaintiff, on the other hand, claims that
the documents attached to the Stipulated Statement
of Facts show (1) that the dentists are independent
contractors (Ex. D Par. 9.01) arid (2) that Plaintiff
is only obligated to use its "best efforts" in obtaining and providing dental services (Ex. D Par.
2.02 and 2.03). Exhibit "C" is the Master Contract
and except for the "best efforts" provisions it
certainly has all the provisions and language of a
group insurance policy coverage."
(R.250).
1.

The obligations of PDS are a nBenefit" under the

Statute.
Were it not for the "best efforts" mechanism used by
Plaintiff, not even Plaintiff would question that the plan
devised by the Plaintiff would be considered insurance under
our Insurance Code.

Plaintiff admits in its brief that

"under the plan proposed by PDS there is a risk" and does
not seriously dispute that "there is a distribution of risk
under the Prepaid Dental Plan."

(Plaintiff's brief Pel0,11).

Plaintiff's claim is that the "basic insurance equation
fails in that PDS does not assume that r~sk."
brief p.11).

{Plaintiff's

The heart of Plaintiff's defense then, is·

that the mechanism of "best efforts" negates an "assumption
of the risk" by Plaintiff.
The position the Commissioner of Insurance took and
that which the trial court took was that the use of "best
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-4efforts" was a "benefit" which falls squarely within the
statutory definition of insurance as a "contract whereby
... one undertakes to ... allow a benefit upon determinable
risk contingencies."

(31-1-7 UCA) .

As noted in Utah Funeral Directors & Embalmers v
Memorial Gardens, 17 Utah 2d 227, 408 P.2d 190 (1965),
after Justice Crockett wrote his opinion in the In re Clark's
Estate, 10 Utah 2d 427, 354 P.2d 112 (1960), the Legislature
amended the statutory def ini.tion of insurance so as to
adopt and codify the court's conclusions.

The statute now

expresses, as clearly and completely as the Legislature
is able to do so, the

cu~rent

definition of insurance under

Utah law.
It is common knowledge that in many insurance contracts,
the assumption of risk by the insurer is not for the total
.risk exposure. of the insured.

In a life insurance policy,

the.insurer assumes a fixed dollar risk which may be as
low as a hundred dollars or as high as millions of dollars.
The insurer does not agree to equate that which it does
in providing a benefit with the total loss to the insured.
The insurer simply "allows" the "benefit" contracted under
the terms of the policy.

Not even Plaintiff would claim

that a $100 insurance policy covers the total loss to an
insured in a matured life insurance policy.

The $100,

however, ·is the "benefit" under the statute that is
"allowed upon a determinable risk contingency."

The same
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-5situation applies in an automobile insurance policy.

Such

a policy may be purchased for a liability coverage of
$100 or $1~0,000,000.
policy

contract~

There may be deductibles in the

In any of these cases, it is not necessary

that the policy insure the entire risk to which the insured
is exposed in order for the policy to be an insurance policy
under our Insurance Code definition.

It is only necessary

that the insurer "undertake to allow a benefit upon a determinable risk contingency."

The same categorization also·

applies to a fire insurance policy or other casualty insurance policy.

A building may be insured against fire for

much less than its value and a high deductible may be part
of the terms of the policy.

Whatever the agreed benefit,

however, it is triggered upon the happening of the determinable risk contingency, i.e. the occurrence of a fire
which does damage to the insured's structure.

Further

examples could be given from the health insurance field or
any other insurance field to show that the benefit does
not have to be co-equal with the amount of the damage at
risk.

Had the legislature intended that the entire damage

be covered in ·order to have such a contract defined as an
insurance policy under the statutory definition of insurance,
the legislature certainly could have used a word other than
"benefit".

Webster's Third International Dictionary defines

benefit as:
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-6"3. Whatever promotes welfarei advantage; profit."
The undertaking of the Plaintiff to use its "best
efforts" to obtain the services of dentists under contract
to Plaintiff to provide the contracted care is certainly
a "benefit" as defined by Webster.
The performance bond contracted by PDS to be furnished
provides an additional "benefit" to the participant or
policy holder.

A recitation from page 12 of Plaintiff's

brief makes clear what this obligation intends:
" ... the Dental Group must provide a performance bond
in an amount equal to the estimated annual payment
due from each Employer Group. The terms of such
performance bond provide that in the ·event the Dental
Group fails for any reason to perform the required
services, the 'bonding company will pay such other
licensed dentist as may be designated by the Participant to perform the specific dental services described in the Dental Group Agreement. Thus, if the
Dental Group failed for any reason to perform any
of the specified dental services the Participant would
rely on the performance bond to. have those services
performed by another ... "
Plaintiff claims because the performance bond is written
by a licensed and regulated insurer, that the "risk is
assumed" by the dental group's performance bond carrier
and not by PDS.
The benefit which PDS provides to the policy.holder
is the agreement that the performance bond will be provided.
PDS binds itself by contract to the dentists to enable PDS
to provide the

necessa~y

services to the policy holders.

PDS then further binds the dentists by contract that the
dentists provide a performance bond.

The initial performance

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-7of the "best efforts" of PDS, then of the dentists, and
finally of the performance bond, is all triggered by my
toothache.

The fact that PDS by contract provides that

others shall furnish the benefit, does not relieve PDS
of providing that which it agrees to do under the contract.
The trial court found the contract between PDS and the
dentist pool to be a third party beneficiary contract
running in favor of the participants.

These are the "bene-

fits" that make. the contract one of insurance under the
statutory· definition.
2.

Cited cases are not analogous.

The lynch pin of Plaintiff's argument is the more than
40 year old Jordan v Group Health Association case, 107
F.2d 239 {1939) and its progeny.

The Jordan case is clearly

distinguishable on at least 5 critical points.
(a) Group Health Association was a "not for prof it"
·corporation.

Plaintiff obviously understands this critical

difference because on page 10 of his brief, he tries
unsuccessfully to shoe-horn the PDS fact situation into
the Jordan fact situation by categorizing the relationship
of the participants in PDS as follows:
" •.• however, a more accurate description woul~ be the
joining together of a number of persons who will need
dental care in order to obtain a discount price for
such dental care."
Although the description is close to the fact situation in
Jordan, it is not the fact situation of PDS.

Jordan

dealt with a non-profit consumer cooperative association
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-8incorporated as a non-profit corporation under Washington,
D.C. law.

Control of the association was in trustees who

served without compensation.

The very idea of the consumer

cooperative was that the consumers - members of the association - band together for their mutual benefit in obtaining
medical services at."wholesale prices."

PDS makes no

claims to being a not-for-profit corporation or association.
It intends to market dental care based on need for a profit.
The reasoning of the Jordan case is not applicable in a
"for profit" situation because it changes the basic purpose
of the association.

In Jordan, at least a claim could be

made that the dominant feature was a non-prof it service
contract.

This is not true with PDS.

The Fishback v

Universal Service Agency.case, 151 P.768 (Wash. 1915) cited
b:

7

Plaintiff is also distinguishable on this ground.

The

distinction is discussed in cases following Jordan.
A plan similar to that proposed by PDS was held to be
insurance in McCarty v King County Medical Service Corp.,
175 P.2d 653 (Wash. 1946).

In this case, the service corpora-

ti'on had contracts with certain physicians and hospitals,
by which they agreed to treat all members of the corporation's plan.

In holding the plan to be insurance, the court

distinguished the plan from similar plans held not to be
insurance in Jordan and an earlier Washington case, Fishback,
which was relied on in Jordan.

Jordan was characterized

as a consumer cooperative, not for profit.

The McCarty
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-9-

plan, on the other hand, was described as a " ... private
corporation, a distinct entity in the eyes of the law,
dealing with employee beneficiaries on the one hand, and
with physicians and hospitals on the other."
662.

175 P.2d at

The court also pointed out-that the service corpora-

tion had full authority to determine the eligibility of any
employee applicant.

In the Jordan plan, the service

corporation was characterized as an agent for the physicians,
but the court in McCarty declared the service corporation
to have such control as to be the moving spirit in the
business, and therefore declared the corporation to be the
principal.
(b) Jordan Court "over-reached" to find socially
desirable result.

In analyzing the Jordan case, the eminent

insurance authority, Professor Keeton, has commented:
"Although the arrangement challenged in Jordan was well
conceived to minimize or subordinate the elements of
risk transference and distribution through the association, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that
the decision was influenced by an appraisal of the
arrangement as socially useful and as giving rise
to less urgent need for public regulation than ordinary
insurance arrangements." Insurance Law Basic Text,
Keeton, Robert E. (West Pub. 1971 at 547).
In a note in the Harvard Law Review shortly after the
Jordan decision was reached, the commentator concluded
similarly to Professor Keeton:
"In the absence of special legislation it would seem
wiser to treat the plans as insurance, but of a type
not intended to be required by the statutes." 52
Harv. L.R. 809,815.
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-10As· stated in Keeton's Insurance Law Basic.Text at
549, the trend today is toward just such special legislation.
(c) Special legislation has met Jordan's socially
.desirable result.
enacted for

me~ical

Special regulatory statutes have been
and health associations in most states,

.sq as to prevent the courts from having to struggle with

wheth.e.r general -insurance statutes are applicable to plans
of this type.

In Utah, our legislature has established

two methods of allowing the resuits thought socially desirable
in Jordan by declaring such a. plan insurance but providing
for a minimum of regulation.

The Non-Profit

Servic~

Corpora-

tion Act, 31-41-1 et seq. UCA and Health Maintenance Organization Act, 31-42-1 et seq. UCA, specifically allow organizations similar to that proposed by Plaintiff to operate
outside the scope of the general insurance laws but still
under minimum needed regulation.
If the Plaintiff in this case wants to reincorporate
as a non-profit corporation, as was the case in Jordan,
and the other cases cited as being controlling by Plaintiff
in its brief, it could be granted a Certificate of Authority
by the Commissioner under Chapter 37 of the Insurance Code.
Several similar dental plans are already operating in the
State under the provisions of this Act.

Both Blue Cross

and Blue Shield operate under the provisions of this Act
and it seems obvious that the legislature intended to meet
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-11the socially desirable.goals that the Washington court. met
in Jordan, supra, by providing a statutory method for doing
so under much less stringent regulations.
(d) Different Statutory Definitions.

The Washing-

ton D.C. statutory definition of insurance under which the
Jordan and Fishback cases were decided, is more limited
than the Utah definition of insurance.

The Washington

statute required "payment of indemnity" (Jordan, supra,.
page 244).

The Utah definition as repeatedly pointed out

provides only that a benefit be allowed.

(31-1-7 UCA.)

This broad difference is crucial.
(e) PDS has created more assumption of risk than
Jordan.

The trial court in its memorandum decision express-

es this distinguishing feature between Jordan and PDS
succinctly (R.251).
"Courts will look to substance rather than form and
an obvious examination of this transaction shows that
Plaintiff is spreadi~g the risk upon determinable
contingencies. Plaintiff cites Jordan v Group Health
Association, 107 F.2d 239 (1939) and Fishback v Universal Service Agency, 151 P.758 (Wash. 1915). These
cases are distinguishable in that the plaintiff in
this case not only says it will use its "best efforts"
as set forth in those cases but goes one step further
and requires the dentist to file a "performance bond"
thus eliminating one element.
In Jordan the court said
" ... insurance also, by the better view, involves
distribution of the risk, but distribution without
assumption hardly can be held to be insurance." .
(107 F.2d at 245, emphasis added). Although the
plaintiff says it has not directly assumed the risk,
it nevertheless has contracted to cover it by Exhibit
B and the performance bond. Participants are third
party beneficiaries of that contract.
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-123.

Case Law confirms Plan is Insurance.

In addition to the McCarty case discussed above, the
Ohio court and the California court have considered similar
plans and determined them to be insurance.
Cleveland Hospital Service Corporation v Ebright,
45 NE 2d 157 (Ohio) affd. 49 NE 929, held such a plan to be
insurance because, among other things, although non-profit,
they used actuarial data to compute their premium schedule,
and therefore were actually insuring the risk rather than
providing a service.
People v California Mutual Association, 441 P.2d 97
(Cal. 1068) held a similar plan to be insurance because
indemnity was a substantial financial proportion of the
business.

PDS is basing its premium schedule on actuarial

data, and, as has already been discussed, a substantial
financial proportion of its business is indemnification of
the participants.
B.

THE PROPOSED PLAN FALLS UNDER THE HEALTH MAINTENANCE

ORGANIZATION ACT.
PDS falls within the scope of the general type of
plan intended to be
Organization Act.

gov~rned

by Utah's Health Maintenance

All underlining in quoted material is

mine.
Sections 31-42-3(4) and (5) state:
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-13"(4) "Health maintenance organization" means any
person:
(a) Who furnishes, either directly or _through
arrangements with others, health care to an enrolled
member in return for periodic payments; the amount~
of said payments are agreed upon prior to the time
during which the health care may be furnished; and
(b) Who is obligated to the member to arrange for
or to directly provide available and accessible
health care.
(5) "Health care" means any of the following or any
combination thereof; Professional or personal services,
facilities, equipment, devices, supplies, medicine,
etc. intended for use in the diagnosis, treatment,
mitigation or prevention of any human ailment or
impairment."
This section declares precisely what PDS proposes to do arrange for health care to enrolled members in return for
periodic payments.
Section 31-42-4 states:
"No person may operate a health maintenance organization within the ?tate of Utah without obtaining a
certificate of authority from the Commissioner."
Section 31-42-6(2) sets forth the conditions that must be
met in order to qualify for a certificate of authority and
subsection (c) thereof states that:
" ..• the commissioner must be satisfied that the health
care plan constitutes an appropriate mechanism whereby
the applicant would effectively provide or arrange for
a provision of basic health care services on a prepaid basis, through insurance or otherwise ... "
Section 31-42-3(6) defines basic health care as:
" .•. as a minimum, emergency care, inpatient hospital
and physician care, outpatient medical services,
and out-of-area coverage."
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-14PDS does not meet the requirement of providing basic
health care.
Section 31-42-2 states as an introduction to the act:
"As a guide to the interpretation and application of
this act, the public policy of this state is declared
to be as follows: The legislature wishes·to eliminate
legal barriers to the establishment of health maintenance organizations which provide readily available,
accessible and quality comprehensive health care to
their members and to encourage.their development as an
.alternative method of health care delivery. The
state of Utah must have reasonable assurance that
health maintenance organizations offering health plans
within this state are financially and administratively
sound and that such organizations are in fact able to
deliver the benefits which they offer."
PDS is the type of plan intended to be goverhed by
Utah's Health Maintenance Organization Act.

However, PDS

fails to qualify for a certificate of authority because·it
does not provide "comprehensive" health care or "basic
health care" as defined by Sections 31-42-2 or 31-42-3(6)
UCA.
C.

INSURANCE COMMISSIONER'S EXPERTISE.
The weight of authority suggests that the reviewing

court in deciding questions as to the proper interpretation
and application of a statute, may properly attach.weight,
or great weight, to the decision of such question by

an

administrative -agency having special competence to deal
with the subject, in line with the general principle that
courts will give great weight to the administrative
construction of a statute (2 AmJur 2d 519), Administrative
Law, §656).

In this case, the Commissioner of Insurance

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

rlSinitially heard the claim of Plaintiff and thereafter
. issued comprehensive Findings and an Order which demonstrate
the

~xpertise

of the Insurance Commissioner in understanding

the specific claim of Plaintiff as well as his ability to
relate the results of a decision to the possible problems
that may flow in its wake.

The Commissioner made the follow-

ing Findings and Order which we submit is an appropriate
result for this Court to reach:
"Findings:
1. The Petitioner proposes to contract with "employer
groups" to arrange for certain specific services
related to dental care to be provided to "participating
employees" of employer groups for a set monthly fee per
participating employee. Such an arrangement is traditionally thought of as a "direct service" contract
financed on a "capitation basis." To arrange for the
services to be performed, Petitioner will, in turn,
contract with dentists who will receive a set monthly
fee for their services. The plan proposed purportedly
only obligates Petitioner to use its "best efforts"
to arrange for dental services for the participants.
2. The monthly fee paid to the Petitioner by the
employer groups provides for a series of services as
needed by the employee members where there is no proportional, direct connection, as there would be if
providers were put on a "fee for service basis,"
between the services and the monthly fee.
Depending
upon the patient's needs, more or less service may be
provided for the same service fee.
Under such an
arrangement risk related to the cost of providing
services ~s transferred by the terms of the employer
contracts to petitioner and may be transferred, in
part, by Petitioner to other dentists by provider
contracts.
3. The proposed plan, therefore, includes all of the
elements normally present in an insurance transaction
viz: (a) an ins~rable interest, (b) a risk of loss,
especially by persons bearing similar risks, (c) .a~
.
assumption and dispersion of the ri~k by the Pet~tioner,
(~) a mechanism to distribute and disburse the·risk
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-16of loss, and (4) payment of a permium to the Petitioner for the transfer of the risk from the insured.
The mechanism is identical to the risk assumption and
dispersion mechanisms contemplated by Chapter 42 of
Title 31, Utah Code Ann., as amended, which governs
health maintenance organizations.
4. Petitioner argues that his obligation extends
only to tµe use of best efforts by the Petitioner and
is not sufficient assumption of risk by the Petitioner
to be deemed to be subject to the Utah Insurance Code.
This argument is rejected.
Instead, the Commissioner
finds that the legislaiure iritended precisely that such
a plan be deemed to be under the Utah Insurance Code
to safeguard the public's interest by assuring that
no misrepresentation, failur~ to perform or deliver,
or other public injury occur, either under a traditional
indemnity arrangement, or more particularly, under more
complex and, therefore, more vulnerable direct health
service arrangements. Moreover, if "best efforts"
were a meaningless consideration in transferring risk
the proposed plan could be a fraud.
5. The proposed plan of Petitioner is an insurance
transaction within the definition set out in the Utah
Insurance Code Section 31-1-7 and requires, therefore,
either the authority of a health service corporation,
a health maintenance organization, or a health ipsurer.
6. The plan as proposed by Petitioner furnishes
"health care" to enrolled members within the definition
provided in the Health Maintenance Organization Act,
Section 31-42-3(5), Utah Code Ann. 1953 as amended.
7. The proposed operating plan falls within the
definition of a "health maintenance organization"
within the Utah Insurance Code, but does not propose
to offer benefits sufficiently broad to meet the "basic
health care services" required to qualify to receive
a Certificate of Authority therefor.
Order:
1. The Plan proposed by Petitioner is governed by
the Utah State Insurance Code and the mode of delivery
and payment proposed is subject more particularly to
a classification as a "Health Maintenance Organization"
under the Utah Insurance Code.
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-172.
The Petitioner cannot operate as proposed without
a Certificate of Authority from the Utah Insurance
Department and Petitioner would have to expand the
proposed services to be offered to meet the basic
health services requirement to qualify for licensure
as a health maintenance organization."
Dated this 27th day of March, 1980.
Respectfully submitted,

William G. Gibbs
Special Assistant Attorney General
351 South State Street·
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies.of the
foregoing Reply Brief to Messrs. John Preston Creer and
David F. Evans, attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant at
1100 Beneficial Life Towerj 36 South State Street, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111 this 27th·day of March, 1980.
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